2023 International Conference on the Cooperation and Integration of Industry, Education, Research and Application (Chongqing)
New Generation of Information Technology Working Conference

The 9th International Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Data Mining (FSDM 2023)

Abstract: Models of Oligopoly are usually divided into two types: classic one and mixed. The classic type of oligopoly is such that all participants are private firms who maximize its net profit. In the mixed oligopoly, there are firms of two types: the private firms who maximize their net profits, and at least one of the agents is a public firm that maximizes another function different from net profit.
For the classic oligopoly, we study a finite game in which the players’ payoffs are functions not only of their strategy profiles but also of certain (parameter) vector related to the whole system state. Relationships between the strategy profiles and the state vector are defined with mappings of rather general forms. Each player makes a decision on her best response to the system’s state and the other players’ strategies under an additional conjecture about the influence of a variation of her strategy upon the variation of the system’s parameters. We propose a concept of equilibrium in such a game and prove its existence.
In the proposed model of the mixed oligopoly, we study a model of a one-product market with conjectural variation in which one of the producers is a public company that maximizes the convex combination of the domestic social surplus and its net profit. The coefficient of this convex combination is named socialization level. In this model, we consider the case when the consumers’ demand function is not necessarily differentiable nor continuous. By introducing the notions of exterior and interior equilibriums, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium. After that, we analyzed the behavior of the market’s equilibrium under the changes in the consumers’ demand. Finally, we considered the particular case when the consumers’ demand is an affine (linear) function to compare the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium against the perfect competition and Cournot equilibriums. Based on these results, we formulate an optimality criterion for the election of the socialization level and provided the necessary conditions for its existence.

Biography: Viacheslav Kalashnikov graduated from Novosibirsk University (Novosibirsk, Russia) in 1977, and entered the Ph.D. Courses of the same University the same 1977, and graduated from this in 1981 after having got the desired Ph.D. grade in Optimization. After that he went to Barnaul, and started working at the Altai State University, from which he returned to Novosibirsk in 1985, where he started to work as Researcher at the Institute of Mathematics of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
In 1991 he moved to Sumy, Ukraine, where started to work at the Sumy State University. In 1993, he entered the Habilitation Courses at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (CEMI), Moscow, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, from which he graduated in 1993 having earned the Habilitation Degree of Doctor of Sciences in Optimization. In 2000, he moved to Mexico, in the city of Monterrey, where he started to work as a Professor at the Ph.D. Courses in Engineering and Systems (PISIS) of the Public University of Nuevo León (UANL). Since 2002 till 2021 he worked as a Professor at the Department of Industrial Engineering and Systems at the Technological of Monterrey.
He is an autor and co-author of more than 100 papers published in prestigeous journals, and delivered more than 250 talks at various international conferences. He served as director of 12 Ph.D. students, as well as 12 Master students, who defended their theses and obtained their desired degrees at various Universities of Russia, Ukraine and Mexico.